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ABSTRACT

While many read Lacan as a structuralist who sought to overthrow the authority of first-person conscious experience, his
work also has resonances and affinities with a broadly phenomenological approach to psychoanalysis. This connection comes
into focus when we bring Lacan’s concept of the imaginary
stage into dialogue with Freud’s early work on hysteria. Lacan
implied that the imaginary stage, while necessary for human
development, nevertheless frustrates a significant dimension of
being human, viz. the human being’s internally conflictual and
contradictory experience that calls into question the very idea of
a unified self or subject. When we read the early Freud’s work,
we find that he is attempting to liberate the hysteric’s self-experience from just this kind of imaginary illusion of unified selfhood
that would restrict and even denies the vicissitudes of subjective
thinking, feeling, and desiring.
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“

he Mirror Stage as Formative
of the I Function as Revealed
in Psychoanalytic Experience”
might be the most famous
paper Jacques Lacan ever wrote.1 My paper
explores one—but only one—way of taking up
the insights of this rich text in order in order
to show an interesting convergence of theme
with Freud’s early case study on the hysteria
of Elisabeth von R. The convergence concerns,
in particular, the question of self-experience,
indeed the experience of being a self at all.
In his famous and brief paper Lacan
(1949/2006) speaks of “the I function in the
experience psychoanalysis provides us of it”
(p. 75, original emphasis). Psychoanalysis is
an experience that gives a new experience of
selfhood. That said, what does psychoanalytic
experience reveal about the first-person self?
It reveals that the I is an “identification” with
an image of oneself first attained during the
mirror stage, but continuing throughout life
1

(p. 76). For Lacan, this identification happens

early. The infant’s self-experience, if we can
even speak of it, begins in a maelstrom of
chaos, multiplicity, and discontinuity of his
or her embodied and rudimentary thoughts,
feelings, and wishes. In the midst of this storm
of felt experience, the infant discovers, in theory by seeing his or her image in a mirror, that
he is one kind of entity—and not many. He or
she “assumes an image” (p. 76) of a unified self
that the mirror reflects to him or her.
Yet, just because original spontaneous
experience is multiple and discontinuous, this
mirror-image of the self that purports to say
that the self is one, “situates the agency known
as the ego, prior to its social determination,
in a fictional direction” (p. 76). The fictional
character of the ego, of the personal conscious
sense of being one unified agent of thought,
feeling, desire, and action, of one’s very self
as a seamless I, will always be in “discordance
with [the person’s] own reality” (p. 76) in its

I am deeply indebted to my teacher and friend Bruce Fink for helping me to understand Lacan.
He is not, of course, responsible for the content of this paper.
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multiple, chaotic, discontinuous experience
—a grammar of experience that is present
not only in human infancy. Thus, the image
creates in the beginning, and goes on creating
throughout life, what Lacan calls an “alienating destination” (p. 76) for the subject. This
image of oneself as a seamless I or self seduces
the subject into positing the “organic inadequacy of his natural reality” (p. 77) and then
fleeing it. This inadequate organic reality just
is the experience of the “fragmented body”
(p. 78) that the ego denies and represses when
it creates the I and the self-image or self-concept we have of ourselves as an I, as one kind
of entity. Hence, again, we have what Lacan
calls “the alienating I function” (p. 79). He
thus unmasks “the function of misrecognition
that characterizes the ego”—a misrecognition
that enforces “imaginary servitude” (p. 80),
i.e. servitude to the imaginary, domination by
and subordination of the discontinuous and
multiple and chaotic moments of spontaneous thinking, feeling, and desiring, to the
imagined unity and character of the self.
Lacan’s understanding of the imaginary,
then, has to do with the issue of human
self-image, self-understanding, in particular
when that image or understanding posits
the self as a unified, seamless, internally
cohering entity. This concern with self-image
or self-understanding converges interestingly
with work by the early Freud, the Freud
whose work Lacan so appreciated. Lacan’s
notion of the imaginary, in this case, is a
convergence with Freud, and Lacan is, here,
a kind of Freudian. What do I mean?
In the case studies on hysteria, Freud
(1895/2000) is significantly concerned with
conscious experience. Indeed his work has
a phenomenological dimension: he clarifies
certain essences of psychological experience
for his patients, i.e. how they qualitatively
think, desire, and feel in their own first-person subjectivity. Nevertheless, Freud is not
merely a phenomenologist: he goes further
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than just reflection. For he believes that
patients come to experience painful neurotic
symptoms because they refuse certain of
the moments of concrete, direct, immediate
experiences he has phenomenologically noted.
Neurotics resist and repress these moments of
experience that prove too dangerous to their
self-image and self-understanding—they
are too sexual, too aggressive, too novel, too
disruptive, too self-questioning. The paradox
Freud points out, however, is that neurotic
symptoms find a cure only if we acknowledge
and embrace just these kinds of dangerous
subjective experiences. Moreover, doing
so means that we must embrace a kind of
selfhood, or self-experience, that goes beyond
any kind of unified self-image.
Freud’s diagnosis is that the pathogenesis
of Elisabeth von R.’s symptom was her refusal
of an immediate and spontaneous desire.
She experienced an untoward desire that she
then, in turn, almost immediately refused to
allow to remain in her conscious experience:
a sexual desire for her brother-in-law and
an attendant gladness that her sister is dead
so that her brother-in-law is available as an
object of romantic attention. However, as his
experience with neurotics was teaching him,
Freud had begun to learn that we humans
cannot unwish a wish, or unfeel a feeling, or
unthink a thought—try as we might! When
a conscious thought, feeling, or desire is so
repugnant to us that we cannot allow ourselves
to retain it in consciousness, our only option
is to repress it. But we humans are also bad at
repression—indeed we find it impossible—
and so there is a return of the repressed in the
form of an initially unintelligible symptom,
one usually psychosomatic in the case of a
hysteric neurotic like those Freud was treating
in his Vienna.
But why is there in Elisabeth, as in all
of us, the desire, the impulse, to repress a conscious moment of experience in the first place?
We repress moments of thinking, feeling, and
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wishing that are intolerable to self-image,
to self-understanding. She and we fold the
current of conscious experience violently
against itself and repress it into the unconscious, from whence it returns painfully as
a mysterious, physiologically inexplicable
symptom.
Let me try to parse the situation out by
engaging Freud’s own words. He tells us that
Elisabeth is a young woman with feelings,
desires, and thoughts of love: “Here, then, was
the unhappy story of this proud girl with her
longing for love” (Freud, 1895/2000p. 143).
Yet there is also jealousy and envy, for Elisabeth
feels “the contrast between her own loneliness and her sick sister’s married happiness,”
a contrast that was “painful to her” and that
gave her “a burning wish that she might be as
happy as her sister” (p. 151). When her sister
dies, though, Elisabeth immediately suffers
from excruciating leg pains that prevent her
from moving. She is not forthcoming about
why she cannot walk. Indeed she is herself,
initially, truly unaware of the cause. Hence
the mystery: a young woman who wants to
love sees her sister dead, a sister whom she
envied for her enjoyment of the kind of love
Elisabeth wanted, and now Elisabeth cannot
walk. Elisabeth herself, we might say, has
died to some degree too through becoming
immobile and corpse-like.
Freud wants to solve the mystery. To do
so, he enforces the rule of free association on
Elisabeth, a rule according to which “she was
under an obligation to remain completely
objective and say what had come into her head,
whether it was appropriate or not. Finally, I
declared that I knew very well that something
had occurred to her and that she was concealing it from me; but she would never be free of
her pains so long as she concealed anything”
(p. 154). Freud speculates that she had experienced some wish, feeling, or idea that she had
then repressed and somaticized in the form
of leg pains. In our terms, she had suffered—

in the sense of undergone and undergone
painfully—an experience that she did not
want to experience. She had an experience
that she tried to refuse. This experience was so
intolerable that she arrested her experiential
current to eject the proleptic experience out
into the unconscious, from whence it returned
as the psychosomatic symptom. But what was
the experience exactly?
The upfront experience was her wish to
possess erotically and romantically her brother-in-law, who was free now that Elisabeth’s
sister was dead. This theory is not only Freud’s
speculation: through free-associative remembering, Elisabeth finally admits it, although
not comfortably or willingly. She remembers
more or less consciously that she once took a
walk with her brother-in-law, in which “She
found herself in complete agreement with
everything he said, and a desire to have a
husband like him became very strong in her”
(p. 155). But the traumatic experience comes
later as she sees her sister’s dead body. When
she comes into the bedroom where her sister’s
body was laid out, she “stood before the bed
and looked at her sister as she lay there dead.
At that very moment of dreadful certainty
that her beloved sister was dead . . . at that
very moment another thought had shot
through Elisabeth’s mind, and now forced
itself irresistibly upon her once more, like a
flash of lightning in the dark: ‘Now he is free
again and I can be his wife’” (p. 156). She has
an ever so brief moment of wishing—lust and
love—toward her brother-in-law, which is so
horrible to her that she immediately rejects it
and ejects it—so she thinks—from the stream
of her experienced consciousness. Therefore,
there is an experience, an erotic wish, which
Elisabeth seems unable to directly experience
because it conflicts with her image of herself
and her understanding about what kind of
person she is and should be.
But what if, just here, it is not this wish
that is what is most pathogenic for Elisabeth?
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What if it is her self-image, her seld-understanding, the sense of herself that is dear to her
that is really the problem? We might think that
Elisabeth’s strong stake in sustaining her image
of herself is the problem, because without this
self-image her desire for her brother-in-law
might have been tolerable to her. Elisabeth
sees herself as a moral person, as someone who
would never think of becoming romantically
involved with her just dead sister’s husband.
As Freud writes, “The girl felt towards her
brother-in-law a tenderness whose acceptance
into consciousness was resisted by her whole
moral being. She succeeded in sparing herself
the painful conviction that she loved her sister’s
husband by inducing physical pains in herself
instead . . . her pains had come on, thanks to
successful conversion” (p. 157). In order to
retain her moral—or moralistic—self-image
she has to eliminate from consciousness her
libidinal desire to possess her sister’s widower
when her sister’s body is not even cold. In
psychodynamic terms, two forces are motivating her—the wish for her brother-in-law and
the wish to be the kind of person who would
never wish for her brother-in-law—and she is
caught in the middle with only a symptomatic
road to go down to solve the conflict.
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning here
that the wish itself is not the primary threat;
nor, perhaps, is the danger to her self-image.
The most profound threat Elisabeth fears
may be her own multiplicity and discontinnuity of experience. She cannot tolerate
her untoward desire(s) because to tolerate
them would mean that she is ‘the kind of
person’ who has such desires. Moreover, if
she is that kind of person, then she is only
that kind of person. That is, if she is one
and only one person with one and only one
trajectory of wishing, feeling, and thinking
that has to operate in a coherent, continuous
way, then she is, in fantasy at least, a horrible
person, so horrible that she cannot admit it
to herself.
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At this point a full discussion of symptom-formation would need to happen, and a
detailed investigation of the process of therapy.
But I want to focus on a particular dimension
of the cure. For Elisabeth is, at one level,
making what we might call an ethical choice,
a choice to refuse to experience her experience.
For, eventually, a breakthrough or healing
came: “the girl’s wish, of which she was now
conscious” (p. 159). Her wish, once conscious,
then repressed and unconscious, is now felt as
a wish among wishes, an experience among
experiences, along and within the fullness of
her flow of consciousness, where experiences
can come and go, rise and fall away, as they
will when left unhindered in their vicissitudes.
The cure happens through a paradox: while
“we are not responsible for our feelings,”
(p. 157) we are responsible for feeling our
feelings, wishing our wishes, experiencing
our experiences, however unpalatable to the
self-images we cherish.
Here is Freud’s ethics of life, his ethics
of experience: we often need to experience
our experience even when it seems safer not
to do so. Yet the ethics of directly experiencing
experience is profoundly difficult. We can
listen to Freud as he describes the process of
Elisabeth von R.’s coming home to her desire:
“the recovery of this repressed idea had a
shattering effect on the poor girl. She cried
aloud when I put the situation drily before
her with the words: ‘So for a long time you
had been in love with your brother-in-law’.
She complained at this moment of the most
frightful pains, and made one last desperate
effort to reject the explanation: it was not true,
I had talked her into it, it could not be true, she
was incapable of such wickedness, she could
never forgive herself for it” (p. 157). While the
pains did seem to dissolve, a different pain
would never dissolve: the pain of coming to
know oneself as a person who has untoward
(but still very human) desires alongside socalled moral desires. Here is where the pain
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of the symptomatic leg ache has to be transformed into the more direct pain of what
we might call being human. This process is
necessary if we are to attain Freud’s idea of
psychic health—experiencing the full texture
of our experience—but it can be hellish
because one’s—often moral—self-image is
called into question. Elisabeth had to accept
that she was the ‘kind of person’ who desired
erotically and romantically her brother-inlaw when her sister had just died.
As a human being, she had to recognize
that her phenomenological stream involved
profound sexuality and aggression. While
Freud would focus on aggression later in his
work, it is not too much to say that we see here
a sexual and aggressive victory on Elisabeth’s
part. Her sister is gone, and Elisabeth is glad,
for now her brother-in-law can become her
husband. For a proper, moral, even moralistic
person like Elisabeth, coming to terms with
accepting this phenomenology of her experience means coming to terms with phenomenological essences, such as sex and aggression,
which may not be pretty. Few people want to
think of themselves as feeling jealousy, envy,
or death wishes, especially toward those they
love. Nevertheless, Freud says that these are
precisely the wishes and feelings we feel and
repress into the unconscious. Moreover, he
insists, we have to feel them directly and fully
if we are to keep up our psychical health. The
first dimension of sustaining our psychic health
is continuing our participation in the immediacy and continuity of our spontaneous stream
of experience, and we can only do so if we are
willing to embrace the concrete content of that
stream of experience directly.
Furthermore, beyond coming to terms
with the facts of what she thinks shameful,
sexuality and aggression, she has to come to
terms with another fact. For she has been
making an even more pathogenic choice to
be one and only one ‘kind of person’. For
Elisabeth von R., her self-image, her self-

understanding, as a particular kind of unified
person is itself the problem. Neurotics need, in
certain ways at least, to become less in touch
with the imaginary illusion of their self-unity.
Thus Elisabeth’s desire for her brother-in-law
is not her only fantasy. Her self-image as
unified and coherent, as one and only one kind
of person, is also a fantasy. It is this fantasy
that fundamentally and primarily punishes
her, that is the engine of her resistance to her
sexual and aggressive experience, and that is
the cause of her symptomatic pain.
Thus while Freud emphasizes difficult,
dangerous dimensions of the human being’s
lived experience of consciousness’s vicissitudes,
such as aggression and sex, the most dangerous
essence of experience may be the conflictual,
fragmentary totality of the experiential flow
itself—or, perhaps better put, flows themselves.
Freud’s aim, that is, was not only to lead us to
experience or embrace our sexual or aggressive
feelings, as if that was the end of it. His broader mission was to restore us humans to an
existence in which we could more capaciously
embrace and sustain the whole gamut of our
experience—to feel all our many feelings,
to wish all our many wishes, to think all our
many thoughts, good, bad, and neutral simply
because they happen and are ours. That is,
Freud invited Elisabeth to return to the always
already present, but often resisted, stream of
her multiple, chaotic, self-contradictory, and
discontinuous experience that defines human
life. This picture of human being stands in
contrast to any sense—in Lacan’s terms any
fiction—she has had of herself as one unified,
coherent, seamless kind of person.
Freud’s treatment of Elizabeth was an
attempt to liberate her from imaginary illusions
of unified selfhood that constrict the often
anarchic vicissitudes of her real concrete flows
of experience. Freud tries to liberate her from
a problematic, pathogenic imaginary ‘capture’
that traps her so she can acknowledge and
embrace, in some sense, all her experiences—

53

MIDDLE VOICES VOL. I

all of her thoughts, feelings, and wishes—
for the first time. She has always experienced
multiply and chaotically and discontinuously,
but only indirectly. The cure for Elizabeth is
to learn to live beyond a unified but false selfimage that has forced to deny and frustrate
her multifarious, differentiated, disconnected
feelings and desires so that she can live out
her conscious experience directly for the first
time instead of repressing dimensions of it
into the unconscious. She embraces experience’s fundamental logic(s) at an epistemic
and existential level. Conscious experience is
discontinuous, incoherent (it does not cohere),
and conflictual. Freud brings Elizabeth to a
place where her subjective experience (beyond
an imaginary self, so to speak) is consciously
conflictual and differentiated in its many
flows, all of which are irreconcilable into only
one self-image of ‘the kind of person’ she is.
For she is many and different.
Returning to Lacan, I hope the reader
has sensed the convergence between Lacan
and Freud this paper has tried to make
visible. Lacan shows how a baby must pass
from an original, fragmentary real into the
imaginary in order to begin to be a subject
at all, but he also hints that this imaginary
stage alienates us from dimensions of being
human that fundamentally define our original
and ongoing body-experience. For Lacan,
we have to learn to live within and after the
mirror-stage, to be sure. However, his work
also raises the question whether the imaginary
and so-called unified self— which would be
a self without experiential conflict, difference,
contradiction, and discontinuity of thoughts,
feelings, and wishes—that is dependent upon
the mirror-stage or mirror-phase in turn
presents its own problems to human thriving.
Does imaginary capture, because it is fictional
and alienating to embodied experience, also
diminish us psychically?
In a way resonant with Lacan, Freud
shows how Elisabeth von R. has to learn to
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live a life beyond the imaginary, beyond the
unified image of herself as one kind of person
that she has assumed. For such an image is
fictional, self-alienating, neurosis-generating.
Paradoxically, one gets to know oneself, who
one is, when one lets go of the notion that one
is one, that there is one self to be experienced,
acknowledged, and known, and lived.
In conclusion, I do not mean to claim
that Freud’s and Lacan’s work are identical,
or that they make the same points in the same
way. Nevertheless, while both seem to imply
that we need a unified self-image in at least
some sense, both also seem to diagnose the
pathogenic character of such a unified selfimage. Their work invites us to think about
ways that we can resist being completely
dominated by myths of self-unity. In doing
so, Freud and Lacan offer us the possibility to
tarry a little more loosely in the realm of the
imaginary, in the images that we inevitably
hold of our selfhood—and perhaps that of
others as well. Such tarrying would entail a
more difficult existence without the securities
of knowing who we are. Even so, such tarrying
might also entail a more generous, forgiving,
and curious attitude to ourselves and to others.
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